Note photo of Avecinna Tomb, Hamedan.

Eid-e shoma mubarak.

---Original Message-----
From: Iran Defence Forum [mailto:support@irandefence.net]
Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2008 11:01 PM
To: bpayne37@comcast.net
Subject: Happy Birthday from Iran Defence Forum

Hello billp37,

We at Iran Defence Forum would like to wish you a happy birthday today!

Algebra knowledge acquired from professor Aboulghassem Zirakzadeh at the University of Colorado in the summer of 1958 was used for Sandia labs job assignment tutorial.

Nojeh Coup

In July 1980, Zbigniew Brzezinski LINK of the United States met Jordan's King Hussein [LINK] in Amman to discuss detailed plans for Saddam Hussein to sponsor a coup in Iran against Khomeini. King Hussein was Saddam's closest confidant in the Arab world, and served as an intermediary during the planning. The Iraqi invasion of Iran would be launched under the pretext of a call for aid from Iranian loyalist officers plotting their own uprising on July 9, 1980 (codenamed Nojeh, after Shahrokhi/Nojeh air base in Hamedan). The Iranian officers were organized by Shapour Bakhtiar LINK, who had fled to France when Khomeini seized power, but was operating from Baghdad and Sulimaniyah at the time of Brzezinski's meeting with Hussein. However, Khomeini LINK learned of the Nojeh Coup plan from Soviet agents in France and Latin America. Shortly after Brzezinski's meeting with Hussein, the President of Iran, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr LINK quietly rounded up 600 of the loyalist plotters within Iran, putting an effective end to the Nojeh Coup.[5] Saddam decided to invade without the Iranian officers' assistance, beginning the Iran-Iraq war on 22 September 1980. ^{1 2}

The Iran spy sting story got out because of

Electronic Engineering Times, January 22, 1996, p. 84.

The Baltimore Sun, About December 4, 1995, pp. 9-11.

No Such Agency Part Four

Rigging the Game

Spy Sting: Few at the Swiss factory knew the mysterious visitors were pulling off a stunning intelligence coup -- perhaps the most audacious in the National Security Agency's long war on foreign codes.

By Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, Sun Staff

Zug, Switzerland. For four decades, the Swiss flag that flies in front of Crypto AG has lured customers from around the world to this company in the lake dis- [words missing] most sensitive diplomatic and military communications value Switzerland's reputation for business secrecy and political neutrality. Some 120 nations have bought their encryption machines here.

But behind that flag, America's National Security Agency hid what may be the intelligence sting of the century. For years, NSA secretly rigged Crypto AG machines so that U.S. eavesdroppers could easily break their codes, according to former company employees whose story is supported by company documents.

The value to NSA of such an intelligence windfall is hard to exaggerate. For NSA effortlessly to read coded messages between top officials of many countries is the equivalent of recruiting reliable spies in key government posts around the world, receiving minute-by-minute reports from them and never risking that they will be unmasked.

NSA appears to have pulled off an international sleight of hand as brazen and brilliant as the original Trojan horse by winning the covert cooperation of the Swiss firm. Wary of encryption companies in NATO countries, the suspicious governments of such prime U.S. targets as Iran, Iraq, Libya and Yugoslavia bought equipment from Crypto AG (or Crypto Inc.). They never imagined that when they coded their messages with the Swiss machines, they may have been sending an easily unscrambled copy directly to NSA headquarters at Fort Meade.